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Greece's membership of the eurozone has long been problematic but these problems 
came to a head in 2015 with an astonishing standoff between a newly-elected Greek 
government led by Alexis Tsipras and a coalition of fiscal hawks headed by German 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. This standoff escalated in July after Tsipras 
called a referendum on the terms of stalled negotiations with the European Union 
(EU) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Schäuble tabled the idea of Greek 
exit from the eurozone. Grexit appeared to be a matter of hours away before the heads 
of state or government brokered a short-run solution of sorts. This deal, which paved 
the way for €85 billion in additional loans, had brutal conditions attached. It ended the 
Greek drama of 2015 but neither resolved the contradictions surrounding Greece's 
membership of the eurozone nor secured the fate of economic and monetary union 
(EMU) more generally. Over the course of the year, the eurozone also grappled with 
other challenges, including slow economic growth, deflationary pressures driven by 
low oil prices, the implementation of recent reforms to eurozone governance and the 
prospects for economic, fiscal, financial and political union set out in the Five 
Presidents’ Report. The overarching theme of 2015 was that eurozone governance 
faced profound problems of legitimacy that policy-makers appeared more adept at 
aggravating than alleviating. 
 
This contribution takes stock of these and other developments in eurozone governance 
in 2015. Section I gives an update on the euro crisis, focusing on the eurozone's 
standoff with Syriza. Section II looks at the economic outlook in 2015 and the factors 
driving the eurozone's tentative economic recovery.
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 Section III explores key 
developments in eurozone monetary policy, including the European Central Bank's 
(ECB) new programme of quantitative easing. Section IV focuses on the first full year 
of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM) and the launch of the single resolution 
board (SRB). Section V turns to economic policy co-ordination and reviews the 
Commission's efforts to promote a more flexible interpretation of the stability and 
growth pact. Section VI takes stock of the Five Presidents’ Report and Section VII 
addresses external representation and the IMF's complex and evolving relationship 
with the eurozone. 
 
I The Euro Crisis in 2015: The Syriza Standoff 
 
Last year's review ended with the fall of Antonis Samaras’ New Democracy-led 
coalition and the rise of Alexis Tsipras’ radical left-wing Syriza, which formed a 
government with the populist, right-wing Independent Greeks in January 2015 
(Hodson, 2015a). From mid-2014, financial markets had started to price in the 
perceived risks from Syriza, which in its Thessaloniki Programme in late 2014 called 
for a radical revision to the terms of EU and IMF loans. The interest rate on long-term 
Greek debt continued to rise in early 2015 while remaining remarkably low in other 
peripheral eurozone economies (see Figure 1). This indicates that this act of Greece's 
fiscal tragedy was written in Athens, even if the overall play had many authors at 
home and abroad. It came as little surprise that Greek voters turned to an anti-
austerity party after six years in which mainstream politicians presided over 
plummeting real incomes, exceptionally high unemployment and eye-watering levels 
of debt that have barely been stabilized.
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- Figure 1 here - 
 
It would be wrong to see Syriza as a single-issue party born of the euro crisis; it traces 
its origins to the pro-European wing of the Greek Communist Party, which split in the 
late 1960s to form Synaspismos before forming a Coalition of the Radical Left in 
2004 (Mac Fhearraigh, 2012). Syriza remains an essentially pro-European party, 
albeit one with strong anti-globalization credentials. This tension was apparent in 
Alexis Tsipras’ promise on the day of his election victory to make ‘the troika a thing 
of the past for our common European framework’, the troika serving as code here for 




Tension between the new Greek government and its eurozone partners was evident 
from the beginning. Greece's new Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, a motorcycling 
Marxist with a black leather trench coat and an aversion to neckties, was by far the 
most unorthodox member of the Eurogroup in its 18 year history. Things got off to a 
bad start when Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem cut short a joint press 
conference with Varoufakis in January at which the former was overheard telling the 
latter: ‘You have just killed the troika’ (Mason, 2015). Varoufakis was charismatic 
and, although he received a warm reception from French Finance Minister Michel 
Sapin in Paris in early February, the same could not be said of the Greek Finance 
Minister's subsequent visit to Berlin. At a joint press conference between Varoufakis 
and Schäuble, the latter declared that the two had ‘agreed to disagree’, strong 
language from a member of the usually consensus-seeking Eurogroup. In the opening 
stages of what would become some of the most turbulent few months in the history of 
the eurozone, the Greek government's principal achievement was to convince other 
eurozone members to drop references to the troika in favour of the more generic term 
‘the Institutions’ (see, for example, Eurogroup, 2015). 
 
Discussions over diplomatic rhetoric gave way to harsher political realities in late 
February, when Greece was offered, and agreed to, a four month extension to its 
existing loan agreement with the EU and IMF. In negotiations with the Eurogroup, 
Varoufakis had initially sought a six-month extension, talks on a new Contract for 
Recovery and Growth and ‘possible further debt measures’, in other words a diluted 
version of the Thessaloniki Programme.
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 In the end, Eurogroup partners insisted on 
four months of funding in exchange for much the same reform commitments as the 
Samaras administration had envisaged. Talks on what to do after these loans expired 
began immediately. 
 
Varoufakis proved evasive about implanting the reforms he had reluctantly agreed to 
in February and EU and IMF officials were kept at arm's length from the Ministry of 
Finance in Athens. The result was that negotiations over future financial support from 
international creditors stalled and the Greek government started to run short of cash. 
In June Greece failed to make a scheduled loan repayment to the IMF, the first 
country to do so since Zimbabwe. 
 
Since Syriza's election victory, Greek depositors had begun to withdraw their savings 
from Greek banks, which became increasingly dependent on short-term financing 
from the ECB. In February 2015, the ECB restricted Greece's access to such financing 
via its ordinary monetary policy operations, citing concerns over the country's 
commitment to international creditors. This left Greece reliant on emergency liquidity 
assistance (ELA) from the ECB, which increased from €50 billion in February to €90 
billion in June. This move put pressure on Greece not only because ELA carries a 
higher interest rate compared to ordinary monetary policy operations but also because 
this emergency financing is reviewed by the ECB Governing Council on a biweekly 
basis. 
 
By the end of June talks between the Greek government and the EU and IMF had 
broken down and Alexis Tsipras took the extraordinary decision to call a referendum 
on 5 July over the terms of these now defunct negotiations. The ECB's refusal at this 
time to increase emergency liquidity support to Greek banks left the Greek 
government with little choice but to shut down the country's banks and impose capital 
controls to prevent citizens from transferring large sums of money abroad. In the 
week running up to the referendum cash withdrawals from ATMs were limited to €60 
per day. Pension payments continued but Greeks travelling abroad were unable to use 
credit cards and parents were allowed to make payments to children studying abroad 
only with special permission from Greek authorities. 
 
Why Alexis Tsipras called this referendum when he did is a puzzle for political 
scientists. As Robert Putnam (1988) argued there can be advantages in a two-level 
game of tying hands through more stringent ratification rules, where such stringency 
encourages international partners to offer concessions that they would not otherwise 
have done. But, as Peter Evans (1993) notes, whatever the theoretical advantages of 
doing otherwise, heads of state or government typically prefer to negotiate on the 
international stage with as much room for manoeuvre back home as possible. 
 
The reasons for calling this vote can be debated but the result of Greece's referendum 
was rarely in doubt. Framed as a vote against austerity, 61 per cent of Greek voters 
rejected the terms that had been offered by the EU and IMF, leading to mass 
demonstrations on the streets of Athens in which the people made clear their 
preference for policy-makers to choose a new path. Not for the first time eurozone 
leaders chose to carry on regardless. Tsipras’ response to the referendum was 
conciliatory rather than defiant; he immediately replaced Yanis Varoufakis, who by 
now was isolated in the Eurogroup and unpopular at home, with the more emollient 
Euclid Tsakalotos as Finance Minister. Several rounds of inconclusive discussion 
between Tsakalotos and the Eurogroup concluded in July 2015 with Wolfgang 
Schäuble's insistence that the heads of state or government consider offering Greece a 
‘timeout’ from the eurozone for at least five years in return for debt restructuring. 
From a two-level game perspective, the timeout proposal chimed with the tendency of 
negotiating partners to walk away from the table when a head of state or government 
ties their hands too tightly at home (Putnam, 1988). And yet, this explanation is 
difficult to square with the fact that Germany, as Greece's largest creditor and the 
largest economy in the eurozone, had a great deal to lose from Grexit. An alternative 
explanation is that Schäuble was, as Michel Sapin put it, seeking to ‘entertain the 
gallery’. The German Finance Minister's tough approach to negotiations won plaudits 
with the German public, who were split on whether Greece should remain a member 
of the eurozone (see Cullen, 2015) and shaped by economic reforms taken in response 
to unification (Newman, 2015). From a European perspective, Schäuble's particular 
vision of European integration may have played a role here too, based, as it is, on the 
idea of closer co-operation among a hard core of European countries with similar 
economic and political philosophies (see Ghironi, 2015). 
 
A meeting of the Euro Summit on 16 July succeeded in reaching an agreement where 
the Eurogroup had failed but only after 17 hours of fraught negotiations. As morning 
broke, with the chances of Grexit increasing by the hour, European Council President 
Donald Tusk reportedly told Merkel and Tsipras: ‘I'm sorry, there is no way you are 
leaving this room’ (Chassany et al., 2015). Thanks to Tusk, or perhaps more 
plausibly, the realization of just how costly Grexit would be to all countries 
concerned, a deal was struck a few hours later. This paved the way for a third round 
of loans from the EU and IMF and hence Greece's continued membership of the 
eurozone. In exchange, the Greek government signed up to a detailed and draconian 
set of reforms, which ranged from cutting pension entitlements to the liberalization of 
milk production and bakeries. Perhaps the most controversial element of this package 
– and the one which almost saw Tsipras walk out – involved the creation of a new 
privatization fund managed by Greek authorities and supervised by EU institutions 
with the authority to sell €50 billion in state assets to repay loans to European 
creditors. 
 
It is hard to underestimate just how much damage this deal did in the short-term to the 
EU's fragile legitimacy. Rarely has the EU drawn such public ire, with the hashtag 
#thisisacoup trending on Twitter as negotiations at the July summit unfolded. As 
usual, the heads of state or government demonstrated their ability to reach a deal 
during moments of duress but rarely have they done so with such open disregard for 
the democratic wishes of a Member State. That said, the Greek crisis is a test of 
multiple democracies and eurozone members were understandably reluctant to 
commit taxpayers money abroad without economic assurances and appropriate forms 
of political accountability. 
 
The deal struck between Greece and its eurozone partners was brutal but it provided 
breathing space for political leaders on both sides. For Tsipras, it brought an 
opportunity to stand up to EU partners but without severing external sources of 
financing. For Germany, Greece's creditor in chief, it ensured that EU conditionality 
and the unwritten rules of EU diplomacy were enforced, but without breaking up the 
euro. At the time of writing (April 2016) – and 2015 shows that European political 
realities can shift suddenly – the deal had stuck. In August, Tsipras secured 
parliamentary approval for some of the reforms sought by EU partners under the 
terms of a new €85 billion loan package before resigning. His re-election victory a 
month later came at the cost of a reduced parliamentary majority but his party was 
also shorn of those members most willing to countenance Greek exit from the 
eurozone. 
 
Although the short-term political situation was stabilized, deep contradictions remain 
over Greece's long-term position in the eurozone. In 2016, Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio 
could breach 200 per cent of GDP – double what it was at the beginning of the global 
financial crisis. As such, a further round of debt restructuring now seems unavoidable. 
This will be politically difficult since most of this debt is now in the hands of 
governments, the EU institutions and the IMF, which will be reluctant to take a loss 
on outstanding loans while extending further credit. The July 2015 deal left room for 
‘additional measures … aim[ed] at ensuring that [Greece's] gross financing needs 
remain at a sustainable level’ (Euro Summit, 2015). Such measures hinge on the 
successful completion of a review of Greece's reform efforts, now expected to take 
place in February 2016. 
 
Even with further debt relief, Greece will struggle to solve its fiscal problems in the 
absence of growth and inflation; the outlook for both economic indicators is bleak. 
Having returned to growth in 2014, Greece's political standoff with EU partners 
pushed it back into recession in 2015. More worrying still for Greece is the outlook 
for inflation. Inflation would help to reduce the real value of Greek debt, but the 
country found itself facing a persistent fall in price levels in 2015 for the third 
consecutive year. In the absence of policy alternatives, the temptation remains for 
Greece to exit the euro, however costly such a move would be for the Greek economy 
and the rest of the eurozone. 
 
II The Economic Outlook: Recovering but not Recovered 
 
In One Market, One Money, a classic study on the expected costs and benefits of 
EMU, the European Commission saw economic growth, price stability, sound public 
finances and the ability to absorb economic shocks as major advantages of the single 
currency (Emerson, 1992). Ten years after the euro's launch in January 1999, the 
European Commission (2008) could plausibly claim that the single currency was 
advancing these aims. A very different assessment is warranted as the euro enters the 
second half of its second decade. Since the euro crisis began in 2009, the single 
currency has experienced an extraordinary degree of economic, financial and fiscal 
instability as Member States have struggled to adjust to the global financial shock of 
2007–08. Having entered a recession twice between 2008 and 2013, the eurozone 
experienced a slow and unconvincing recovery in 2014 (Hodson, 2015a). Real gross 
domestic product (GDP) in the eurozone increased by 1.6 per cent in 2015, an 
improvement on the 0.8 per cent growth rate recorded in 2014 if not exactly a cause 
for celebration. The United States, in comparison, saw real GDP rise by around 2.5 
per cent for the second successive year. 
 
The eurozone economy was buoyed in 2015 by a recovery in domestic demand. The 
contribution of public consumption, investment and, above all, private consumption to 
real GDP growth was higher in 2015 than was the case in 2014. Historically low oil 
prices and interest rates and a looser fiscal policy helped here as did falling levels of 
unemployment (see below). The European migration crisis had a positive 
macroeconomic effect on the eurozone by putting upward pressure on public 
expenditure (Aiyar et al., 2016) and the effects are likely to be greater still as those 
who are granted asylum enter the labour market (European Commission, 2016, p. 36). 
Turning to external demand, eurozone exports to the rest of the world increased in 
2015, aided, in part, by a marked depreciation of the euro relative to the currencies of 
key trading partners. Be that as it may, the contribution of exports to real GDP growth 
was entirely cancelled out by a rise in imports to the eurozone. A worrying trend for 
the eurozone is that export growth looks set to remain well below rates recorded 
before the global financial crisis hit in 2007. This situation is due, in part, to China's 
continued slowdown. In 2015, China's demand for imports grew by 0.5 per cent 
compared with 7.0 per cent in 2014. 
 
As always, the economic performance of eurozone members varied (see Figure 2). 
Real GDP in France and Germany grew by 1.7 per cent and 1.1 per cent, respectively. 
France's recovery was long overdue, with real GDP expanding by more than 1 per 
cent for the first time since 2011. It is too soon to say whether the economic reforms 
pushed through by France's Economy Minister Emmanuel Macron were paying off, 
with low oil prices and a more favourable euro exchange rate the more obvious 
explanations for the country's improved short-term performance. Lithuania, which 
became the 19th EU Member State to join the eurozone in January 2015, saw real 
GDP growth slow from 3.0 per cent to 1.6 per cent, its exposure to Russia's troubled 
economy being a contributory factor. 
 
- Figure 2 here -  
 
Unemployment remains a chronic problem for the eurozone, although the 
unemployment rate fell from 11.6 per cent to 11.0 per cent in 2015 (see Figure 3). 
Within the eurozone, seven members recorded unemployment rates in excess of 10 
per cent in 2015 and, of these, two, Greece and Spain, saw rates in excess of 20 per 
cent. In 2015, Ireland became the first country at the heart of the euro crisis to get its 
unemployment below 10 per cent. Of the 44,100 additional people who found 
themselves in employment in Ireland in 2015, 8.5 per cent gained employment in 
construction. This resurgence in construction mirrors an increase in Irish property 
prices after the house price crash of 2007, with the OECD warning against ‘risks of 
another damaging property cycle’ (OECD, 2015, p. 25). 
 
- Figure 3 here - 
 
The harmonized index of consumer prices remained static in 2015 (Figure 4). Falling 
energy prices added to deflationary pressures, with the cost of a barrel of Brent crude 
oil falling from over USD 100 in January 2014 to below USD 40 in December 2015. 
Among the factors that could continue to depress oil prices is the Iranian nuclear deal, 
announced in July 2015 and which the EU played a significant part in brokering.
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 In 
2012, the EU imposed a ban on oil imports from Iran over concerns about its nuclear 
programme. The lifting of this ban in 2016 is expected to increase Iranian oil 
production by as much as 1 million barrels a day. 
 
- Figure 4 here - 
 
In the eurozone as a whole, the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP fell from 2.6 
per cent to 2.2 per cent and government debt increased from 94.5 per cent to 93.5 per 
cent (see Table 1). Four out of 18 eurozone members found themselves with 
government borrowing above the excessive deficit procedure's 3 per cent of GDP 
threshold, and government debt as a percentage of GDP was in excess of 60 per cent 
in 14 countries. Posting a positive primary balance (a measure of government 
borrowing that excludes interest repayments) is a conventional indicator of a country's 
ability to reduce its government debt. In 2015, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus all posted 
primary surpluses. Greece, in contrast, went from a primary surplus of −0.4 per cent 
to a primary deficit of −3.5 per cent in 12 months, underlining the devastating effects 
of the country's fiscal standoff with eurozone partners. 
 
- Table 1 here - 
 
III Monetary Policy: Quantitative Easing (At Last) 
 
Facing persistent risks of deflation, the ECB Governing Council finally introduced a 
fully-fledged programme of quantitative easing in January 2015. This took the form 
of the expanded asset purchase programme (APP), which encompassed the existing 
asset backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and an expanded covered bond 
purchase programme (CBPP3) (see Hodson, 2015a) and a new public sector purchase 
programme (PSPP). The PSPP committed the Bank to buy bonds issued by national 
governments, EU institutions and EU agencies to a total of €60 billion per month until 
the end of September 2016. This step was significant because it entailed large-scale 
government bond purchases by the ECB for the first time. It also involved a much 
greater financial commitment on the part of the ECB, which had previously been 
spending €10 billion per month on covered bonds and asset-backed securities. 
 
The European Central Bank enjoys a high degree of statutory independence under the 
Treaties but its independence does not remove it entirely from the sphere of national 
politics. National central bank governors outnumber members of the ECB Executive 
Board by a ratio of around 3:1 on the ECB Governing Council and while the national 
central bankers are independent, they are appointed by national governments to head a 
national institution. As a consequence, on major matters of eurozone monetary policy, 
national interests are never entirely absent. This point is clearly discernable in relation 
to the APP's provision on the purchase of bonds issued by national governments, EU 
institutions and EU agencies. Of these purchases, the eurosystem as a whole will 
guarantee only a small share of government bonds. This leaves the Banque de France 
exposed to any losses that might result from the purchase of French government 
bonds, the Bank of Greece exposed to losses from Greek government bonds and so 
on. As Armstrong et al. (2015) note, this arrangement discourages reckless fiscal 
policies by national authorities by leaving national central banks exposed to the risk 
from such recklessness. And yet, the authors note, this arrangement could undermine 
the effectiveness of crisis management in the eurozone. Under the APP, for example, 
the Bank of Greece could, in principle, find itself insolvent because of ECB purchases 
of Greek government bonds. 
 
It is too soon to say whether the APP has been a success. Although inflation 
expectations – a forward-looking measure of inflation – increased in the first half of 
2015, they fell back in the second half of the year. In December 2015, the Governing 
Council agreed to extend the APP to the end of March 2016 ‘or beyond if necessary’ 
(ECB, 2015, p. 5). At the same time, the ECB Governing Council decided to extend 
its experiment in negative interest rates, cutting the interest rate on its deposit facility 
from −0.2 per cent to −0.3 per cent. 
 
 
IV Financial Supervision: The Single Resolution Board as a De Novo Body 
 
The year 2015 was a fairly quiet one for financial supervision after the ECB's high-
profile stress tests in late 2014 (Hodson, 2015a). Yet, in its first full year of operation, 
the SSM held 38 meetings and took around 1,500 decisions on various aspects of 
financial supervision. The SSM's most important act was the completion of a 
eurozone wide supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), a stress test of the 
eurozone's 120 largest banking groups. As part of this exercise, the SSM set capital 
ratios for the banks under review, requiring some to set aside additional capital for 
2016. Two such banks were Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, which were 
required to raise a combined €2.5 billion in additional capital amid concerns over the 
management of some Italian financial institutions and their exposure to non-
performing loans. The SSM's involvement in matters that have traditionally been the 
preserve of national authorities seemingly rankled with some, including the Deputy 
Governor of the Bank of Italy who warned the SSM against ‘arbitrary’ and 
‘unwarranted’ decisions that, by reducing banks’ capacity to lend, could be harmful to 
growth (Henry, 2015). Such protests did not deter the SSM, which announced in 
December 2015 that it would launch an investigation into Italy's cooperative banks. 
 
The launch of the SRB was another key development in 2015. A major pillar of 
European Banking Union alongside the SSM, the SRB is responsible for dealing with 
failing financial institutions in eurozone members and other participating members.
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As of 1 January 2016, when it became fully operational, the SRB assumed overall 
responsibility for brokering the sale or resolution of failing banks, ‘resolution’ 
referring in this context to changes to the legal, operational and financial structures of 
a bank with the aim of preventing outright bankruptcy. Previously it fell to national 
taxpayers to bail out failing banks. This situation gave rise to the so-called ‘doom 
loop’ between banking and fiscal crises (Obstfeld, 2013), as occurred in Ireland where 
government support to banks bankrupted an otherwise solvent state. To break this 
doom loop, the SRB will facilitate bank resolution via the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF), an instrument funded not by public funds but via levies from financial 
institutions that will reach €55 billion by 2023. 
 
The SRB is an instance of what Bickerton et al. (2015) call a de novo institution, that 
is, EU bodies created by Member States to carry out specific policy-making tasks at 
arm's length from the traditional Community institutions. Under proposals put 
forward by the Commission in July 2013, the Commission would have been formally 
responsible for deciding whether a failing bank should be resolved. This proposal 
went too far for the ECOFIN Council, which decided that the decision on whether to 
resolve a bank should rest with the ECB and national representatives but not the 
Commission (see Howarth and Quaglia, 2014). Under the final regulation, which was 
adopted by ECOFIN and the European Parliament in July 2014, the SRB is 
empowered to decide on whether a bank is failing or at risk of failing but it can only 
do so after the ECB has been given an opportunity to make such an assessment. 
Thereafter, it falls to the SRB to determine whether and how the bank in question 
should be resolved and whether and how the SRF should be used for this purpose. In 
cases where the use of this fund requires more than €5 billion, this decision falls to the 
plenary rather than the executive body of the SRB. Whereas the executive board 
includes the chair and four full-time members of the SRB, the plenary includes 
representatives of each national resolution authority. 
 De novo bodies operate at arm's length from the European Commission and the SRB 
is no exception in this regard. The Commission's most important role here concerns 
its right to put forward nominees to the SRB executive, albeit on the basis of an open 
competition and with the final decision being taken by the European Parliament. 
Thereafter, the Commission plays a second order role in relation to the SRB, the 
former being entitled to attend meetings of the executive and plenary as a permanent 
observer rather than a full participant. The Commission can object to the use of the 
SRF on grounds of competition or public interest, but the SRB is required to alter its 
use of the fund in such cases only if the Council supports the Commission's 
objections. In short, the SRB illustrates Member States’ willingness to extend the 
scope of EU decision-making into a highly sensitive policy domain but without giving 
new powers to the Commission along traditional lines. 
 
V Economic Policy Co-ordination: Reinterpreting the Growth Pact 
 
At the beginning of 2015, seven eurozone members had excessive deficits. Of these, 
Malta saw its excessive deficit procedure closed in June 2015 after the EU finance 
ministers, acting on a recommendation from the Commission, agreed that the 
country's budget deficit was below 3 per cent of GDP and forecast to remain there. 
Five of the six remaining states – Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal – faced 
no additional steps under the excessive deficit procedure. France faced closer 
scrutiny, having been in a state of excessive deficit since 2009. After giving France an 
initial deadline of 2013 to correct this deficit, EU finance ministers decided to extend 
this deadline by two years in view of the ‘unexpected adverse economic events’ 
facing the French economy at this time (Council of the European Union, 2013). Two 
years later, with little prospect of this deadline being met, the ECOFIN Council 
agreed to give France until 2017 to correct its excessive deficit, this decision being 
based, in part, on a favourable assessment of the structural reforms underway in this 
country since 2012 (Council of the European Union, 2015). 
 
The flexibility offered to France in 2015 provides further proof that the EU's reformed 
fiscal rules are more flexible than some of its fiercest critics allow. Further evidence 
in support of this interpretation can be seen in the Commission's January 2015 
Communication Making the Best Use of the Flexibility Within the Existing Rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (European Commission, 2015). Through the ideas set 
out in this document, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (2014) sought to 
make good on his ‘manifesto commitment’ to a more flexible interpretation of the 
Pact. Specifically, the Communication set out clauses relating to investment and 
structural reform and clarifications related to cyclical conditions designed to show 
how the Commission will use its leeway for interpretation under the stability and 
growth pact to promote growth and jobs. In the end, Juncker's move did not quite 
work as intended. In April 2015, the Council's legal service issued an opinion, which 
suggested that such questions of interpretation should be codified in the Economic 
and Financial Committee's (EFC) Code of Conduct on the Stability and Growth Pact 
rather than left in the hands of the Commission. This power play between the 
Commission and the national finance ministries that comprise the EFC had yet to 
conclude at the year's end as negotiations over a revised code of conduct continued. 
VI The Future of Eurozone Governance: The Five Presidents’ Report 
 
The claim that the EU is in dire need of reform is accepted by critics and champions 
of European integration alike. And yet the Union is almost always engaged in some 
institutional revision or another while simultaneously debating the need for new, more 
ambitious reforms. The publication of the Five Presidents’ Report in June 2015 
illustrates well the EU's infatuation with reform, this being the third high-level report 
on EMU since Member States began to reform the eurozone in 2010. The five 
presidents in question – heads of the Eurogroup, European Council, European 
Parliament, European Commission and European Central Bank, respectively – took 
their cue from the Euro Summit in October 2014, which called on four out of these 
five presidents ‘to prepare next steps on better governance in the euro area’ (Euro 
Summit, 2014). The unforeseen participant was European Parliament President 
Martin Schulz, whose eventual involvement reflected his close working relationship 
with Jean-Claude Juncker and the European Parliament's determination to play a 
greater role in eurozone affairs. 
 
Mirroring the structure of the Delors Report on EMU, the Five Presidents’ Report 
outlined three stages to complete EMU by 2025. The first stage (1 July 2015 – 30 
June 2017) included tentative thoughts on a common deposit insurance scheme, 
designed to complete European banking union and proposals for the creation of a euro 
area system of competitiveness authorities and a European fiscal board. The system of 
competitiveness would involve the creation of national agencies to track 
macroeconomic imbalances. It can be understood as the latest in a series of initiatives 
designed to foster national ownership over EU economic surveillance rather than 
relying on the Commission to play the role of bad guy from Brussels (Deroose et al., 
2008). The proposal for a European fiscal board envisaged a new independent agency 
empowered to issue opinions on Member States’ stability programmes and draft 
budget plans. That the Commission saw this board as a potential threat is suggested 
by the speed with which it established a European fiscal board in October 2015 on its 
own terms and without involvement from EU finance ministers. 
 
Stages 2 and 3 of the Five Presidents’ Report were less detailed, the report suggesting 
only that the former should begin in June 2017 and that the latter should end by 2025. 
Among the ideas slated for stage 2 was the codification of ‘commonly agreed 
benchmarks for convergence’ (Juncker et al., 2015, p. 5), a variation on the Euro Plus 
Pact, an intergovernmental agreement that tried (but ultimately failed) to encourage 
Member States to enact specific structural reforms in national law. More ambitious 
still was the report's call for a ‘macroeconomic stabilization function for the euro 
area’ designed to adjust to large macroeconomic shocks and the creation of a 
eurozone treasury. Detail on stage 3 was sketchier still, the report suggesting simply 
that it would begin when all other stages had been completed. 
 
The weakest elements of the Five President's Report were its ideas on legitimacy. 
Here the report called for closer interaction between European and national 
parliamentarians in a revamped European semester, a modest procedural proposal that 
sat uneasily with the five presidents’ grand visions of economic, fiscal, financial and 
political union. The report was also equivocal about the need for treaty change. 
Reference was made to the integration ‘into the framework of EU law the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance; the relevant parts of the Euro Plus Pact; and 
the Inter-governmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund’ during the 
proposed ‘deepening by doing’ stage (1 July 2015 – 30 June 2017). But the report 
also emphasized the need to ‘make the best possible use of the existing Treaties’ 
during stage 1 (Juncker et al., 2015, p. 5). Conveniently – and presumably 
deliberately – stage 2 was not set to begin until after the latest possible date for a 
British referendum on whether to remain in the EU, the question of whether the UK 
might be disadvantaged by deeper eurozone integration being a sensitive one in the 
Brexit debate. 
 
It remains to be seen what impact the ideas contained in the Five Presidents’ Report 
will have on the future of eurozone governance. Understandably preoccupied with the 
European migration crisis, EU heads of state or government delayed discussion of the 
report until December 2015, at which point the Council was instructed to address 
(although not necessarily agree to) Commission proposals stemming from the report 
without delay. Questions concerning ‘the legal, economic and political aspects of the 
more long-term measures contained in the report’, the European Council (2015) 
agreed, would be returned to before the end of 2017. This lack of urgency invites the 
question of whether the EU needed yet another ambitious high-level report on the 
future of EMU at this time. 
 
VII External Representation: The Eurozone and the IMF 
 
The eurozone's fragmented system of external relations has been widely criticized in 
the scholarly literature. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
allows the Council to establish a unified representation in ‘international financial 
institutions and conferences’ (Article 138 TFEU), but the Commission's attempts to 
make use of this provision in 1998 were rebuffed. Since then Member States have 
adopted ad hoc and informal measures to coordinate the EU involvement in IMF, the 
World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the Group of 7 (G7) and the Group of 20 (G20). The result is that a variety of actors – 
including officials from the ECB, Eurogroup, European Council and Member States – 
speak for the euro in these international forums. The fragmented manner of these 
arrangements has been criticized by a number of scholars (for example, McNamara 
and Meunier, 2002; Cohen, 2009). And yet, eurozone members have shown 
themselves to be capable of speaking with one voice in the G20 and the IMF 
(Hodson, 2011, pp. 97–107). 
 
Building on the Five Presidents’ Report, the European Commission put forward a 
proposal in October 2015 on establishing a more unified representation for the 
eurozone on the international stage.
7
 The proposal envisaged coordinated EU 
positions within the IMF being prepared by the Council, the Eurogroup, the Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC), and its subsidiary body, the Eurogroup Working 
Group. Coordination across a range of institutions risks being bureaucratic and slow 
moving, thus raising concerns about the ability of a single eurozone constituency to 
respond rapidly to fast-changing events in the international monetary system. 
 
Debates about the eurozone's fragmented system of external representation often 
overlook the fact that European influence within the Fund is considered to be 
disproportionately high by many commentators outside of Europe. This influence was 
seen in 2015 when calls by First Deputy Managing IMF Director David Lipton, an 
American, for a non-European to head the Fund failed to gain traction.
8
 In February 
2016, former French Finance Minister, Christine Lagarde secured a second term as 
IMF Managing Director, thus continuing Europe's informal grip over the leadership of 
the Fund for the time being. 
 
The IMF's involvement in the euro crisis since 2010 has added a new dimension to 
debates about Europe's relationship with the Fund. What matters here is not only the 
€60 billion in loans that the IMF has contributed to eurozone members but also the 
Fund's new role within EU policy-making. This role goes beyond the pooling of 
resources by the EU and IMF to encompass a role for the Fund in monitoring the 
conditions attached to European loans and eurozone surveillance more generally. The 
IMF's emergence as a de facto institution of the EU (Hodson, 2015b) can be seen, for 
example, in the European Stability Mechanism Treaty, which states that the 
‘Commission – in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together with the IMF 
– shall be entrusted with monitoring compliance with the conditionality attached to 
the financial assistance facility’. 
 
This Europeanization of the IMF has caused tensions among EU Member States, as 
evidenced by Greece's aforementioned attempts to ‘kill the troika’, but also between 
the EU and the Fund. Striking in this respect was the fact that the IMF had not, at the 
time of writing, agreed to contribute to the €85 billion package of loans offered to 
Greece in August 2015, even though IMF officials were involved in negotiating the 
terms attached to these loans. Speaking in July 2015, Christine Lagarde suggested that 
the IMF would not lend to Greece unless eurozone members first agreed to restructure 
Greek debt.
9
 On this point, the IMF emerged as an unlikely ally of Greece, even 
though Alexis Tsipras remained steadfast in his position about the need for a 




The word drama is overused in describing the EU's susceptibility to crises or, as 
Davis Cross and Xinru Ma (2015, p. 1053) put it, the overwhelming tendency of 
commentators to frame ‘challenges and setbacks to EU integration as existential 
crises’. Theatrical metaphors lend themselves all too easily to Greece but this cannot 
mask the very real existential threats that surround the country's place in the eurozone. 
So dramatic was Greece's fiscal crisis in 2015, indeed, that the BBC staged A Greek 
Drama, a radio play that imagined tense behind-the-scenes discussions between 
Alexis Tspiras, Yanis Varoufakis, Angela Merkel and Jeroen Dijsselbloem. An 
unusual subject for a radio play, it offered further proof of the EU's public struggles to 
contain the effects of a sovereign debt crisis that has profound implications for the 
lives of ordinary Europeans and which, after six years, is still far from being resolved. 
 
The deal struck by the euro summit in July 2015 kept Greece in the eurozone in the 
short term but it did so at the cost of imposing even tougher economic conditions on 
Greece and without addressing the root causes of its fiscal problems. The damage to 
the EU's legitimacy was also significant, the euro summit seeming to set aside the 
Greek people's opposition to austerity, as expressed in its referendum on negotiations 
with the EU and IMF and, more generally, in the rise of Syriza. The heads of state or 
government showed themselves to be capable, once again, of governing under 
pressure, but they did little to engender public trust in EU policy-making. 
 
Concerns over the legitimation of eurozone governance were not confined to Greece 
in 2015. The eurozone's economic recovery picked up, but low growth remains a 
longstanding problem for EMU, alongside more recent challenges such as high 
unemployment and the risk of deflation. EMU's legitimacy is judged, in no small 
measure, on the euro's ability to deliver price stability (see Verdun and Christiansen, 
2000; Hodson and Maher, 2002), which makes the threat of deflation politically as 
well as economically damaging. The ECB's new programme of quantitative easing 
offered a belated response to this problem, but it remains to be seen whether it will 
bring inflation back towards the Bank's target of 2 per cent. Concerns over legitimacy 
were seen too in the field of financial supervision, where the SSM, in its first full year 
of operation, delved deeper into the affairs of European banks and faced political 
pressure for so doing. The Commission treaded more carefully in the field of fiscal 
policy, offering a more flexible interpretation of the stability and growth pact, but 
encountering resistance from national officials as a result. Finally, the Five President's 
Report offered yet another vision of EMU's future, advocating economic, fiscal, 
financial and political union. These proposals varied in the detail provided but none 
grasped the question of how to legitimate a more complete EMU that would go well 




1. On developments in the European economy as a whole, see Benczes and Szent-Ivanyi's contribution 
to this volume. 
 
2. See also Featherstone's contribution to this volume. 
 
3. Euronews, 26 January 2015. 
 
4. See Reuters, 19 February 2015. 
 
5. See Pomorska and Vanhoonacker's contribution to this volume. 
 
6. In April 2015, the government of Denmark, a non-eurozone member, announced its intention of 
joining European Banking Union. This decision has not yet been ratified at the time of writing 12 
months later. 
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Figure 1: Bond Yields for Selected Eurozone Members, 2007-2015 
 
Note: 10 Year Government Benchmark Bond Yields Relative to Germany 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Warehouse 
 










Note: Unemployment as a percentage of the civilian labour force. 
 









Note: Annual change in Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices 
 
Source: European Commission AMECO database  










Euro area -2.2 93.5 0.2 
Austria -1.6 85.9 0.7 
Belgium -2.9 106.1 0 
Cyprus -1.0 108.4 2.2 
Estonia 0.3 10.1 0.4 
Finland -3.2 62.7 -2.1 
France -3.7 96.2 -1.6 
Germany 0.5 71.6 2.1 
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